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The dating of the end of the classical period and the demise of the influence of Athens on 
the politics of the era is generally considered to arise from the events following the death 
of Alexander the Great in 323.1  However, the Macedonian impact on Athens was firmly 
established when Philip defeated the Greeks at the battle of Chaeronea in 338. Despite 
this, the Athenians attempted to regain their former status in the Greek world for another 
fifteen years. The treaty formed from the League of Corinth created a political hiatus that 
allowed Athens to adapt to a new era of Macedonian rule. The political and economic 
status of Athens at the time of the battle of Chaeronea was to prove vital to the recovery 
of the polis and enable the Athenians to adapt to Macedonian domination. The reaction 
of Philip to the Athenians after Chaeronea was also crucial to this endeavour. The terms 
of the League of Corinth treaty defined the relationship of Athens with the Macedonian 
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Philip’s victory at Chaeronea in 338 and his military endeavours throughout Central 
Greece clearly demonstrated the ingenuity of his leadership and the capability of his army.  
Isocrates remarked that after the battle of Chaeronea Philip’s renown was so heightened 
that a campaign into Persia would be an easy accomplishment in comparison.1 Following 
the battle of Chaeronea and confined to the conditions of the League of Corinth, it is 
generally accepted that Athens had a relatively peaceful fifteen-year period. This was 
certainly so when compared to the turmoil of the Peloponnesian war and its aftermath.  A 
Pan-Hellenic peace may have seemed unattainable in the inter-state reshuffling of 
alliances in the years following 404. The battle of Chaeronea was not only a victory for 
Philip and his Macedonian army but it also brought dissolution to the territorial warfare 
of the Greek states. During the 340s many of these conflicts were between poleis with a 
pro-Philip or pro-Athenian stance.2 Philip called to order the central Greek poleis in 
organising the League of Corinth and in doing so he confirmed his authority over them. 
The prestige Philip gained by conquering the great polis of Athens would have given 
essential motivation to his own army in the event of an Asian campaign.  
The League of Corinth was formed just months after the battle of Chaeronea and 
established some stability in the turmoil of post-Chaeronea Athens.  In practical terms it 
alleviated the need for proposed emergency measures that may have undermined the 
democratic institution. The terms of the League required Athens to aid the distant 
campaign in Asia, which had been planned by Philip and carried out by Alexander.  In 
                                                          
1 Isoc., Epistle 3, To Philip, 2.5.  
2 Rhodes 2009: 352-353. 
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reacting to the campaign the Athenians adapted to a new form of warfare. The 
circumstances of Macedonian domination necessitated a revision of internal defence, 
encouraging trade and an appreciation of the concerns of metics. The most positive aspect 
for the Athenians was their freedom from Macedonian garrisons and the non-imposition 
on internal affairs from the Macedonian kings. This enabled the Athenians to develop the 
aspects of sovereignty which were once emblems of their former glory and, although 
dominated by Macedon, enabled the Athenians to sustain their economy in the wider 
Greek world.  
This assessment of an important era in Athenian development aims to unravel the methods 
that the Athenians employed to adapt to Macedonian domination. Philip’s lenient 
treatment of the Athenians after the battle of Chaeronea is worthy of review.  Philip’s 
approach was also acknowledged by Alexander who needed stability in Greece in order 
to focus on his campaign into Asia.  The distant campaign and laissez faire attitude of the 
Macedonian kings enabled the Athenians to develop institutional devices that ensured 
their survival in a territorially changed world.  As Philip had to adapt his approach to the 
Greeks by ensuring the League was devised on traditional democratic principles, so too 
Athens adapted their approach to foreign traders.   
The real challenge for the Athenians in this period was to establish trading links and 
portray Athens as a leading polis worthy of reciprocal benefaction from foreign traders.  
This challenge had to be met within the confines of the terms of the League of Corinth.  
The territorial adjustments made by Philip, and Alexander in Asia, complicated this task.  
The extent to which the Macedonian kings interacted with the Athenians was crucial to 





Philip and Athens: The function of the League of Corinth in the aftermath of the 
battle of Chaeronea 338/337 B.C.E. 
 
1.1. The arrangement after Chaeronea. 
Philip’s conquest of the Greek states at Chaeronea was sealed by his issuing of the terms 
of settlement with the Greek poleis individually. The Athenians expected devastation after 
Chaeronea considering Philip’s revenge on the cities of the Chalcidian league. A version 
of these events was told to the Athenians by Demosthenes, ‘I pass over Olynthus and 
Methone and Apollonia and the two and thirty cities in or near Thrace, all of which Philip 
has destroyed so ruthlessly that a traveller would find it hard to say whether they had ever 
been inhabited’.3 However, the Athenians were treated with unexpected leniency by 
Philip, which was in complete contrast to the punishment meted out to Thebes.4  Athens 
was to keep its democratic constitution in place, no Macedonian garrison was to be placed 
in the polis and the border town of Oropus was restored to Athens from Theban hands.5  
Oropus was of strategic importance; as a coastal town it made the fertile land of Euboea 
accessible, but for the Athenians it also had great religious significance.6  In giving a 
Boeotian town to Athens, Philip further subdued the Thebans and at the same time defined 
the boundary of Attica.  The significance of Oropus is seen in its removal from Athenian 
hands in the later wars of the diadochoi, as a statement of Macedonian authority.7 Athens 
                                                          
3 Dem., Third Philippic, 9.26 most likely an exaggeration but this is an account that the Athenians would 
be reacting to; Dem., On the Crown, 18.213; Diod. Sic., Library, 16.52.9, 53.1-3. 
4 Worthington 2008: 154; Justin, Philippic, 9.4.6-9; Demades, On the Twelve Years, 1.9. 
5 Aesch., Against Ctesiphon, 3.85; Dem., On the Crown,18.99; Diod. Sic., Library, 15.76.1; Demades, On 
the Twelve Years, 1.9; Plut., Demosthenes, 5.1 
6 Paus., Description of Greece, 1.34.1-5.  
7 Diod. Sic., Library, 18.56.6. 
4 
 
also maintained control of her islands to which Philip added Samos.8 This strategically 
important island was also used as a means of enforcing authority when Alexander 
announced it be returned to the Samians under his exiles’ decree. Philip also allowed the 
Athenians to retain administrative control of Delos, an island of great importance to 
Athens, not least as an emblem of her past glory.9  
 
Perhaps this arrangement with Athens was an acknowledgement by Philip of pro-
Macedonian sentiment among some Athenians such as that expressed by Aeschines and 
Isocrates. Although in his flattering letter to Philip, Isocrates gave him a clear reminder 
of Athenian greatness with his words, ‘our power is equivalent to yours, and you should 
seek in every means to win us over’.10  Philip’s action is portrayed by Polybius as noble 
restraint and his treatment of Athens as a convenient opportunity to express his good 
character.  Polybius reported that after Chaeronea Philip returned Athenian captives 
without ransom, some with a gift of clothes, and paid honour to the Athenian dead.11   
Although this is an indication that Philip had respect for Athenian culture, it is far more 
probable that his actions were motivated by military strategy rather than sentiment, 
particularly at such a crucial stage of his planning with regard to Persia.12 Philip’s 
benefaction towards Athens served to establish his role as conqueror of the Greek states 
just as effectively as he did with the poleis he punished with the awareness that what is 
given can also be taken away.   
  
The reason for Philip’s clemency toward Athens remains a matter of debate although most 
                                                          
8 Diod. Sic., Library, 18.56.7. 
9 Arist., Athenian Constitution, 61.6; 62.2; Diod. Sic., Library, 18.56.7; Paus., Description of Greece, 
1.34.1. 
10 Isoc., Epistle 2,To Philip 1.20. 
11 Polyb., Histories, 5.10. 
12 Sealey 1993: 198-199. 
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scholars agree that the Athenian knowledge of sea-warfare, and its strong harbours, would 
have been vital components for Philip if he undertook a campaign against Asia. If 
Athenian thalassocracy was Philip’s reason for leniency toward Athens, this would 
suggest that his intention throughout his campaign into central Greece was to have 
strategic access into Asia with the aid of the Athenian fleet.13  However, Philip’s territorial 
claim across the Northern Aegean had given him access to many poleis with seafaring 
expertise and Macedonia had sufficient naval power of her own to have gained that 
control in the North.14 It may also have been evident to Philip that Athens had 
demonstrated a capacity equal to his in manipulating allied states. The Athenians had 
remained a powerful force in the face of adversity in the past, particularly at the end of 
the Peloponnesian war when their navy had suffered but recuperated.  Athens would be a 
crucially beneficial subject-ally, albeit necessarily restrained. The form of this restraint 
would come with the creation of the League of Corinth just a few months after Philip’s 
victory over the Greek states at Chaeronea.15 
 
1.2. The League of Corinth. 
The League of Corinth established two parties in the contract: Philip and the Greek 
States.16 Both sides undertook oaths to seal the terms of the treaty.17 This treaty overrode 
all previous interstate councils and leagues. The most pertinent to Athens was the final 
dissolution of the Second Athenian Confederacy, which had been weakening since 355.18 
                                                          
13 Worthington 2008: 156 suggests that as Philip wished to justify an Asian campaign by claiming 
revenge for Persian war atrocities against Athens, in such case harming Athens would have been a 
contradiction.  
14 Hammond 1989: 128, 184-185; Polyaenus, Strategem, 4.2.22; Dem., First Philippic, 4.22; Arrian, 
Campaigns, 2.20. 
15 Diod. Sic., History, 16.89.2-3;  
16 Hammond & Griffiths 1979: 625. 
17 Tod 1948: 177; Rhodes & Osborne 2004: 76; Hammond & Griffiths 1979: 625, n.7 this establishes the 
Greek side of the agreement. 
18 Paus., Description of Greece, 1.25.3; Rhodes 2009: 276-278; Ryder 2003: 75. 
6 
 
The League of Corinth was unlike previous bicameral treaties in that Philip devised all 
the conditions and membership was not voluntary. Refusal to join the League would have 
meant political alienation at a volatile time for Greece.  The concept of legitimising 
alliances and the conditions of such a treaty were not unprecedented in the Greek world.  
Considerable similarities lay with the conditions stipulated by the Second Athenian 
Confederacy. Recurring themes within the treaties highlight common concerns of the 
period. The wording of the terms of the Second Athenian Confederacy invited 
membership from both barbarians and Greeks who were not allied with the Great King.19 
This confederacy was a reaction to the King’s Peace, which, like Philip’s league, had a 
non-Greek authority guaranteeing peace in Greece.  
Inclusion into the Second Athenian Confederacy could have been an opportunity for 
Macedonian participation in Greek, and particularly Athenian, affairs.  By not responding 
to the Confederacy, which had Athens as hegemon, Philip highlighted one motive in his 
creation of the League of Corinth in that he desired to be uncontested hegemon and 
establish Macedonian right of succession. This was also evident in his approach to the 
Peace of Philocrates in 346, where Philip did not desire other poleis to join, as he was not 
ready at that point in time for a larger undertaking in central Greece.20 The martial 
superiority he displayed at Chaeronea led the way for a peace treaty completely on 
Philip’s terms but the treaty was not devoid of benefits to the Greek poleis involved.  
  
                                                          
19 Tod 1948: 123; Rhodes & Osborne 2004: 22. 
20 Perlman 1985: 166-167.   
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The terms of the League of Corinth were crafted in such a way that no Greek state was to 
interfere in the policies of another, nor to cause internal unrest that might lead to a change 
in constitution, nor to ally with a foreign power that might harm another Greek state,   
… and I shall neither break the agreement with Philip (?) nor take up arms for 
harm against any of those who abide by the oaths (?) neither by land nor by sea; 
nor shall I take any city or guard-post nor harbour, for war, of any of those 
participating in the peace, by any craft or contrivance; nor shall I overthrow the 
kingdom of Philip or his descendants, nor the constitutions existing in each state 
when they swore the oaths concerning the peace; nor shall I myself do anything 
contrary to these agreements, nor shall I allow anyone else as far as possible.  
If any one does commit any breach of treaty concerning the agreements, I shall go 
in support as called on by those who are wronged (?), and I shall make war against 
the one who transgresses the common peace (?) as decided by the common council 
and called on by the hegemon; and I shall not abandon…21 
Macedonia was not a member of the League and was not bound by its regulations. As 
hegemon, Philip was not aiming to create a new body of Macedonian citizens among the 
poleis of the League.  Instead, with each state tied into its own political system and 
without external interference, the discrete constitution of each polis was suspended under 
the conditions of the league.  In Athens a strong sense of patriotism was evident in the 
speeches of this period.22 This would be an expected reaction in adapting to the 
domination of a foreign monarch as democratic values were highlighted. Glorifying 
Athenian democratic values also created a distinction between Athens and other member 
                                                          
21 Rhodes & Osborne 2004: 76; Tod 1948: 177.  
22 Lyc., Against Leocrates, 1.83, 102-7; Dem., Against Leptines, 20.161; On the Crown, 18.205 in most of 
his speeches Demosthenes appealed to the glory of Athens.  
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states of the League.  The motivation for Philip to enforce this aspect of the treaty does 
not seem to be purely to protect the constitutions of the Greek poleis.   Instead, Philip’s 
treaty would keep the poleis of the League from inter-state conflict and, in turn, 
effectively protect Macedonia from an offensive retaliation from central Greece.  Philip 
could then attend to bigger business. For Philip, with an eye on an Asian campaign, this 
was a corralling of Greek states, giving them a sense of a common bond but in effect 
stifling their relationship with each other.  This structure also determined Philip as 
hegemon and the representative of the Greeks when he declared war against Persia.23  
Throughout Philip’s advancement into central Greece, peace negotiations and diplomatic 
gestures were continually offered to the Greek poleis as an alternative to battle.  This 
allowed for Philip’s military advances to be deemed as defensive warfare. This was 
notable in his championing of Apollo in the Third Sacred War24 and in his declared 
motivation for war against Persia.  As leader of the Greeks, Philip’s campaign against the 
Persian king was presented as retaliation for the Persian destruction of Greek temples 
under Xerxes’ command.25  The Athenians could only respond with enthusiasm to such a 
campaign.  The declaration of a war of vengeance also served to justify to the Greeks the 
presence of Macedonian garrisons, set up after the battle of Chaeronea, in Thebes, 
Corinth, Chalcis and Ambracia.  These garrisons had seemed to be a contradiction to the 
terms of the League, which expressed autonomy for the member poleis but with Philip as 
champion of the Greek cause, they could be seen as a protective force rather than a feature 
of foreign dominance.  
                                                          
23 Worthington 2008: 160; Diod. Sic., Library, 16.89.2. 
24 Hammond 1989: 114-115; Justin, Philippic, 8.2.3. 
25 Hammond 1986: 572; Polybius, Histories, 5.10.8. 
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The terms of the treaty were probably not fully established at the outset.  Plutarch’s 
account stated that the Athenians held reservations over joining the League when it was 
clear that the members of the League would be called upon to supply manpower and 
ships.26 This suggested that the war contribution was not manageable for Athens.  The 
extent of the demands made on the individual states of the League is still debated, 
particularly regarding manpower. Evidence suggests that surplus manpower was a 
problem within Athens. Isocrates reported on the availability of exiles and mercenaries 
in Greece.27 After the battle of Chaeronea there would have been an abundance of such 
troops for hire. The treaty requirement to supply troops to Asia may have been a solution 
to this problem within Athens of employing a redundant, non-citizen portion of the 
population as well as a means of keeping Philip and Alexander placated.  
The Greek poleis entered the contract with Philip with a guarantee that they remain 
autonomous and would maintain their political constitutions under an oath to keep the 
peace. This emphasis on peace and co-operation could have been an early step toward 
Pan-Hellenic political unity. A common culture and language was long established. 
Corinth would have been a territorially strategic centre of government. However, for 
Philip, the League of Corinth was not a means of creating a politically unified Greece, 
which would have been extremely difficult to sustain under a monarchy. The demand on 
resources and manpower would have diverted from Philip’s plans toward a campaign into 
Asia. The exposure to democratic ideology had the potential to cause instability within 
the Macedonian army and lead to the overthrow of an autocrat such as Philip.  Instead, 
adequately protected by the terms of the League of Corinth, Philip and his descendants 
were to continue as Macedonian kings consistent with Macedonian laws.  
                                                          
26 Plut., Phocion, 16.3-4; Diod. Sic., Library, 16.89.3; Tod 1948: 183; Justin, Philippic, 9.5.4. 
27 Isoc., To Philip, 5.96. 
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The emphasis on the democratic constitution of many of the participating poleis in the 
treaty28 served as a firm reminder to Philip not to enforce Macedonian monarchy on 
League members.  However, it also served to highlight Philip’s unique status within the 
League as a hereditary monarch. This was to Philip’s benefit as it reinforced his authority 
as a monarch, particularly to his own army.29  Although Philip seemed to have held 
respect for Athenian culture, developed in a democracy, his motivation would have been 
to maintain the Macedonian monarchic institution. Macedonian royal succession was not 
one of primogeniture but was dependent on the survival of the strongest among those who 
held claim to the title. The evidence of this was seen in the upheaval that followed the 
death of Philip.30 Without a successor to make claim to the title, Alexander’s death 
heralded even more confusion as the diadochoi fought for their claim to the royal title. 
Rule by force would be the natural condition of Macedonian monarchy.  The 
incompatibility of monarchy and democracy was highlighted by Demosthenes when he 
stated that a patriotic Athenian would condemn the imposition of Macedonian rule 
because of, ‘those outrages and indignities, which a commonwealth in subjection is 
compelled to endure, as more dreadful than death’.31  
Although under the leadership of a monarch, the League was structured on principles that 
upheld the traditions of democratic institutions. This is apparent in such factors as the 
election process for hegemon of the council, the synedrion or council of representatives, 
the justification for war, the seal of an oath and proportional equality, which was 
presumably devised by the size and resources of the poleis.32 The previous alliances of 
                                                          
28 Tod 1948: 177, commentary. 
29 Diod. Sic., Library, 16.36.2 an indication of how dependent Philip was on the morale of his troops. 
30 Diod. Sic., Library, 17.2.3-6. 
31 Dem., On the Crown, 18.205. 
32 Tod 1948: 177; Hammond & Griffiths 1979: 383-392 on how alien these concepts were to the 
Macedonian court; Dem., On the Crown, 18.106 on the use of proportional contribution in trierarch 
reforms in 340; Aesch., Against Ctesiphon, 3.142-3 on division of contribution by Thebes and Athens for 
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Greek poleis had been successful in their formation because all poleis had long recognised 
the necessity of being part of a larger body in terms of economic benefit and military 
protection.  This would have been a major incentive for joining the League to establish 
some security in dealing with the might of Philip and his army. The benefit to Philip in 
appealing to Greek traditions was that he could claim to be on equal and amenable terms 
with the League members.33  
In a further manipulation of the Greek poleis, Philip did not use the title of king (basileus) 
in his dealings with central Greece. The ramifications of this decision may have been to 
endanger his authority as a monarch in the eyes of his Macedonian army. This raises the 
question as to whether Philip had any choice other than to appeal to Greek democratic 
tradition in his approach to central Greece.  In dealing with other kingships, Philip 
arranged marriage alliances as a means of asserting his control and this had the additional 
benefit of securing Macedonian traditions and dynastic succession.  As Philip was 
hegemon elect but not a league member, he avoided the position of a constitutional 
monarch, which was his role in the Thessalian League.34 Philip’s rejection of his royal 
title and his acknowledgement of democratic principles perhaps gave him the necessary 
respect to avoid being viewed as barbarian, thereby distinguishing his form of rule from 
that of the Persian King. This was further aided by his taking the Phocian votes on the 
Delphic Amphictyony, which was a carefully guarded Greek-only institution.35  
Although it is reported that the Macedonians spoke a form of Greek dialect36 and had over 
time courted many notable Athenians, such as the playwright Euripides, the idea of the 
                                                          
the battle of Chaeronea; Plut., Demosthenes, 17.3 shows that equal divisions in war were desirable but not 
always achieved.  
33 Perlman 1985 offers a thorough assessment of this diplomatic tradition. 
34 Dem., On the Crown, 18.152. 
35 Hammond & Griffiths 1979: 451-454; Diod. Sic., Library, 16.60.1. 
36 Plut., Eumenes, 14.11; Rhodes 2009: 334. 
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Macedonians as non-Greek was to remain a contentious issue.37 Hammond suggests that 
this was only relieved when the Macedonians were contrasted with the Romans in the age 
of the diadochoi.38 Despite the cultural barriers between Macedonian and Greek, the 
League established the Macedonian King as hegemon of the Greeks in perpetuity. The 
granting of hegemon was by election of the League members, and the League 
representatives did elect Philip and, in turn, Alexander to this position.39 In a similar 
manner, Philip had achieved the position of tagus of the Thessalian League, in perpetuity, 
in 352.40 This position was granted in response to Philip’s skilful diplomatic 
manipulation.41 It is also a consideration that perhaps many Greek states were aware of 
Philip’s designs for a campaign in Asia and, fearful of Persian retaliation, the co-operation 
of the League to keep Philip and his formidable army at the head seemed the safest option 
for Greece.   
An advantage for Philip in forming the League lay with the diversity of opinion among 
the member poleis.  Full cooperation among members may have been disrupted by past 
conflicts and political alliances, especially those such as Athens who had held a dominant 
position in Greece in the past. Members were unlikely to reach a consensus on all matters 
concerning Philip’s actions.  The regularity of the meetings of the League is unknown 
although it is probable that they were left to consider such details themselves.  However, 
the intervals between their congresses would have had little effect on the immediacy of a 
monarch’s sole decisions while on campaign.  Leaving the League or reneging on any 
part of the contract meant alienation from the protection of this federal state.  Thus the 
                                                          
37 Dem., On the Crown, 18.185; Din., Against Demosthenes,1.24. 
38 Hammond 1989: 19-20. 
39 Diod. Sic., Library, 16.89.3; Arrian, Campaigns, 1.1.1-3; Justin, Philippic, 11.2.4-6, 3.1-2; Plut., 
Alexander, 14.1-5. 
40 Worthington 2008: 65; Diod. Sic., Library, 17.4.1. 
41 Ryder 1994: 247-248.  
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League members enforced the regulations of the treaty without the need for Philip to 
oversee details. The treaty of the League of Corinth was to remain central to the 
relationship between Athens, Philip and Alexander. It was only on the death of Alexander 
that the regulations of the treaty were abandoned.       
The League of Corinth was greatly to Philip’s benefit. Worthington argued that the 
League of Corinth saw Philip create the first national state in the history of Europe.42  Of 
all the poleis involved, Athens appeared to be the most affected by its conditions. The 
new structure under Philip was a demotion for Athens from a long-established dominance 
in previous Greek alliances. Island states that had previously been under domination by 
Athens, Thebes and Sparta over time, may have anticipated a new freedom under Philip.43  
Pausanias considered this demotion to be the reality behind the leniency shown to Athens 
in that they had in fact received the worst of all penalties in the loss of the Athenian 
‘maritime empire’.44 The difference now was that Athens no longer held hegemony or 
indeed any stronger position than the other League member states.   
Despite the loss of prestige, Athens experienced a successful fifteen year period aided by 
the regulation of Greek affairs under the League of Corinth. The distraction of the 
conquest of the northern Aegean and the Asian campaign for Philip and Alexander 
facilitated the Athenians’ attempt to regain the status they had enjoyed in the past. The 
territories left under Athenian control by Philip, aided this pursuit.  The following chapter 
offers an assessment of the Athenian internal response to Philip’s terms and will give 
some insight into how far Macedonian autocracy impacted on the polis. 
 
                                                          
42 Worthington 2008: 163. 
43 Ryder 2003: 76.  




Athenian sovereignty and self-determination under the League: 
 
The benefit of the League of Corinth for Philip was evident.  For Athens the egalitarian 
nature of the League had obvious limitations for the formerly great empire. Athens was 
humbled, as Pausanias rightly stated.45 However, Athens entered the treaty with Philip in 
a position of economic stability, the theoric and stratiotic funds were healthy and the fleet 
was in good condition. As the dust settled on Chaeronea there was a sense of continuity 
with no suggestion of the conventions of Athenian life being interrupted. As the city walls 
were reinforced after Chaeronea, the Athenian citizens anticipated the next festival of 
Dionysia.46  With the formation of the League of Corinth stability was restored within 
Athens and the normal practices of the polis resumed. Philip’s laissez faire attitude to 
Athenian affairs gave them considerable freedom to pursue their sovereignty.  This was 
realised in coinage, civic defence and the development of the fleet. 
The timing of the imposition of the League of Corinth treaty was of further benefit to 
Athens in that it curtailed some of the emergency measures that were proposed in the 
post-Chaeronea turmoil.  Measures such as the manumission of slaves to aid in war would 
have had long term detrimental implications for the city.47 The measures that were 
enforced were to favour Athens in the following years.  These included strengthening the 
city’s walls and instituting laws to increase available manpower.48 Further internal 
adjustments were developed as Athens adapted to the Macedonian requirements of the 
                                                          
45 Paus., Description of Greece, 1.25.3.  
46 Aesch., Against Ctesiphon, 3.34.  
47 Dem., Against Aristogiton, 26.11; Lyc., Against Leocrates, 1.36-37, 41; Hyp., Fr. 18, 28, 29; Plut., 
Moralia, X, 849a. 
48 Dem., On the Crown, 18.248.  
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League treaty, such as the reforms to the ephebeia institution.  This particular reform 
aided polis defence, had economic advantages and reinforced the value of Athenian 
citizenship. In this way the terms of the League aided Athenian economic recovery and 
the pursuit of self-determination for the polis. To an extent Athens maintained the 
emblems of empire and could strive for some of her former authority within the League. 
A consequence of these pursuits was a renewed vigour for democratic values.   
2.1. Defence of the constitution 
One of the most important considerations for democratic Athens was to adapt to the 
domination of a foreign monarch.  The Athenian law of Eukrates against tyranny in 337/6 
may provide some insight into the Athenian reaction to a new order with Philip as leader 
of the Greeks. It is probable that Eukrates was one of the anti-Macedonian orators who 
received a death sentence in 322.49 The timing of the legislation coincided with the 
formation of the League of Corinth treaty and was a possible reaction to the treaty itself 
or to the political status of Athens in the aftermath of Chaeronea. The terms of the League 
of Corinth protected each member poleis from constitutional overthrow and this law may 
simply have been a way of reiterating and emphasising this important concern. It could 
also be read as an Athenian response to Philip himself, a warning not to broach further 
into the Athenian political arena.50 This was probably a very real threat as Alexander was 
later accused of overthrowing a democracy and installing a tyrant in Pellene.51 Alexander 
also reorganised the constitutions of the towns of Asia Minor that were subject to Persian 
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taxation.52  Although these towns were probably outside the bounds of the League, the 
exercise showed that constitutional amendment was part of the Alexander’s strategy.   
Plutarch gives a sense of the turbulence within Athens in reaction to the defeat at 
Chaeronea, as the divided people sought to elect a general, ‘the best citizens were filled 
with fear’ and appealed to the people with ‘entreaties and tears’.53 It may have been the 
case that the polarity between the pro and anti-Macedonian camps within Athens had 
caused a movement toward internal constitutional change, which would have contravened 
the terms of the treaty. In Eukrates’ law a specific restraint was placed on the activity of 
the Areopagus if the constitution was overthrown,  
And it shall not be permitted to any of the councillors of the Council of the 
Areopagus, if the people or the democracy at Athens is overthrown, to go up to 
the Areopagus or to sit together in the meeting or to deliberate about anything at 
all; and if when the people or the democracy at Athens has been overthrown any 
of the councillors of the Areopagus does go up to the Areopagus or sit together in 
the meeting (synedrion) or deliberate about anything, he shall be without rights 
(atimos), both himself and his descendants, and his property shall be made public 
and the tithe given to the Goddess.54 
 
This would indicate that the defenders of democracy were alarmed by a strong pro-
Macedonian influence in the council of the Areopagus. 
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The specific attention given to the Areopagus suggests that another likely reason for the 
law lay in the emergency proposals after the battle of Chaeronea.  At that time the 
Areopagus, by temporary decree, took sole authority to sentence to death anyone caught 
fleeing the city.55  The crime of betrayal (prodosia), which applied to those fleeing at a 
time of crisis, was considered an offence toward the community. The sentencing by the 
Areopagus contravened the role of the Heliaea, the judicial court of the Ekklesia which 
was the legal enforcer of penalties for offences against the state.56 The Areopagus also 
over-rode the legal process of eisangelia, which involved reporting such a crime to the 
Ekklesia and then instigating proceedings.  This was generally employed for serious 
offences against the state.57  A new role for the Areopagus in the fourth century was the 
apophasis procedure, which entitled the council to carry out an investigation either on 
their initiative or by request of the Ekklesia.58  It was primarily carried out for offences 
against the polis and again the apophasis reverted back to the Ekklesia.59 The authority 
that the Areopagus held in the mid fourth century enabled it to hold trials for serious 
offences but these were restricted to acts against the person such as homicide, wounding, 
poisoning or arson. The political constitution of the 330s stated that, ‘these are the only 
charges tried by the council of the Areopagus’.60 The law of Eukrates itself was concerned 
with prodosia and the approval of the law was passed by the nomothetai, a body 
comprised of current jurors who were allotted annual positions from the citizen 
population.61 The enforcement of the law of Eukrates evidently lay in the hands of the 
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people as was appropriate for an act against the state. In over-riding the legal process on 
an offence against the community the sole authority of the Areopagus after Chaeronea 
must be considered extraordinary and reactionary. Authority given by temporary decree 
would have necessitated a law putting the Areopagus back in its original role and making 
it accountable to the Ekklesia. Accountability to the people was the core value of the 
democratic institution.  
The wording of the law of Eukrates could also indicate an awareness of a potential 
oligarchy forming.  The phrase ‘if the people or the democracy at Athens is overthrown’ 
occurs three times in this law.  This is distinct from the term tyranny.62  If a tyranny were 
formed it is unlikely that there would still be an Areopagus, or any democratic institution, 
still in place.  The law of Eukrates forbade the meeting of the Areopagus in the event of 
an overthrow, which would indicate an oligarchy rather than a tyranny.  Dinarchus 
accused Demosthenes of proposing the decree that gave the Areopagus council 
exceptional powers and he suggested that they were acting as an oligarchy.63 Lycurgus 
later defended the Areopagus from jeers when he alluded to this period.64 The threat of 
an oligarchy rather than a tyranny became a more realistic fear after the restoration of 
democracy in 403/2.65  The necessity for a specific law against tyranny or oligarchy 
highlighted the danger the Athenians saw in an overly powerful council in a time of 
political upheaval. The terms of the League denied a change in constitution for the poleis 
involved but if there were a pro-Philip Areopagus the advent of an oligarchy was a 
possibility.66  The law of Eukrates was written on a stele at the top of which was a relief 
depicting the new cult of Demokratia, which evidence suggests was reinvigorated in this 
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period.67  This would indicate that the law was a reaction to the unprecedented situation 
the polis now found itself in, under the control of a foreign ruler. Whatever the situation 
was that called for Eukrates’ law, it is evident that it inspired a renewed focus on 
democratic values in Athens.  
2.2. Coinage 
One of the possible motives for Philip’s leniency toward Athens after Chaeronea lay in 
his recognition of the potential revenue from the Laurium silver mines. Laurium was the 
most important source of silver in Central Greece.68 Under Philip’s terms, Athens was 
permitted to keep the right to coin silver.69  The productivity of the mines was at its height 
when Athens was under the financial control of Lycurgus from 336.70  Philip would not 
have been oblivious to the strength and stability of the Athenian silver currency during 
his reign. Although the production of Athenian coinage had suffered a decline after the 
Peloponnesian war, by the time Philip came to power it was once again in popular use 
throughout Greece and its use had extended as far as Sicily and Egypt.71 A steady pattern 
of distribution remained until Alexander adopted the Attic weight standard for his 
universal currency. The popularity of the Athenian currency after the League of Corinth 
remained strong. This was partly due to the renown of the Attic standard for reliability of 
weight and consistency of supply but also to Philip’s laissez faire standpoint. Coinage 
was a symbol of empire, which Athens had long recognised and which now allowed for 
the continued importance of Athens to the Greek world even after her loss of hegemony.   
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The importance of coinage as a stamp of authority is expressed in the late fifth and early 
fourth century laws. In the past Athens had asserted her control over tributary states by 
enforcing minting laws.  Prohibitions on minting silver to other than the Attic standard 
are noted in a decree of 432. The implications of such demands go beyond economic 
measures and become a means of enforcing Athenian authority.72 In 415 silver minting 
was forbidden outside of Attica.73  There were no restrictions on other poleis for the 
issuing of gold coins. Athens did not mine for gold, and electrum coinage, adapted to be 
compatible with the Attic silver weight standard, was welcome in the polis. Philip, in 
contrast, had a tendency to adopt whatever standard was in place when he conquered a 
territory, preferring iconography as a means of enforcing his authority. In his role as 
archon of the Amphictyonic council, Philip issued coins inscribed ‘of the Amphictyons’ 
using the Pheidonian standard of central Greece.74  In his northern territories Philip used 
the Thracian standard for his silver coins and the Attic for his gold. Alexander in turn 
recognised the potential for propaganda in coinage and also the capability of the Laurium 
mines.  He chose to mint both gold and silver to the Attic standard. This move saw the 
demise of other Greek standards and gave Athens a monopoly on the production of silver 
coinage in central Greece.75   
The production of the Athenian currency was further aided by Philip’s unexpected 
leniency after Chaeronea, which curtailed the initiation of many extraordinary measures.  
Subsequently the terms of the League rendered many emergency measures unnecessary. 
One such measure was that proposed by Hyperides for the manumission and arming of 
‘one hundred and fifty thousand’ slaves.76  The diversion of slave labour from the silver 
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mines would have resulted in a similar financial catastrophe to that in 413 when runaway 
slaves from the Laurium mines had put a halt to operations that saw silver reserves 
depleted by 407.77  The emancipation of slaves for the purpose of revolution was 
addressed in the League terms as a violation.78 This would suggest that Hyperides’ 
proposal had been seriously considered by the polis in response to the crisis after 
Chaeronea.  In the past, the credibility of the Athenian empire had been at stake when the 
coinage was devalued.  Aristophanes Frogs of 405 bemoaned the poor substitute of 
copper that proclaimed the end of Empire.79 The restoration of the mines saw Athenian 
recovery, once again depicted in Aristophanes Ecclesiazusae of 392, as silver coinage 
was starting to replace the copper.80 An inscription of 375/4 showed that measures were 
taken to ensure counterfeit coins were not circulated in Athens81and is evidence of the 
abundance of copper coins still in circulation at that time. In 354/3 there was a severe 
penalty imposed for distributing counterfeit coins in Athens.82 The unhindered 
continuation of production in the mines under the hegemony of Philip and Alexander 
averted the potential for such problems to arise.  
At the time of the formation of the League of Corinth, the Athenian silver mines were 
functional and an important enterprise for the polis. The recovery of the high standard in 
Athenian coinage was in place from the years 350-340 and heavy investment was made 
in silver mining.83 The mines were leased by the state under strict regulations.84 
Demosthenes stated, in his speech of 328, that the antidosis law held exemptions for those 
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involved in the mining business.85 These businesses were not included in an antidosis 
challenge. This was an innovation of the period, possibly to encourage investors.86  
Although the reason for this exemption was not explained by Demosthenes, it does 
enlighten us to the exceptional status placed on mining operations.  The leasing and 
working of the silver mines may have been considered a service to the state for mining 
its most precious resource.  Also, the working of state mines involved competition for 
contracts and therefore rents were probably high.  This may have been considered 
sufficient expenditure for the lessee to avoid being called for a liturgy. There are 
suggestions in the ancient sources of mining being less stable and therefore less lucrative 
than farming. A speech from Demosthenes argued over the fluctuation in wealth from 
mining but it must be seen as oratorical manipulation as farming was obviously just as 
prone to instability from drought or the disruption of war.87 However the comparison 
Demosthenes makes between the two enterprises of farming and mining does show where 
the wealth of Athens lay.  Such laws as the antidosis exemption enabled Athens to recover 
the superiority of the Attic standard and, through consistency of supply and purity of 
silver, demand was ensured. Xenophon, in c.354 commented on the superiority of 
Athenian silver as desirable cargo exchange by traders. This was in comparison to that of 
other poleis whose local currency had no circulation in other states.88  The mines were 
highly active in the 340s89 and as the battle of Chaeronea drew near, the financial 
capability of Athens was evident: The costs of the battle were proportionally divided 
between Athens and Thebes, with Athens making the greater contribution.90   
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The reliance the Athenians had on the silver mines is evident. The protection of the mines 
was aided by Philip’s distribution of territory. Philip gave Athens control of Oropus, to 
the north-west of Attica, which, along with the islands to the east, was strategically useful 
as protection for the Laurium mining trade.  This was an important consideration as it was 
only as far back as 413 that the mines had been cut off from Athens by the Spartan army 
seizing Decelea.91  The island territories also facilitated the movement of Athenian 
coinage.92  Coin hoard finds indicate that much of the Athenian silver moved eastward to 
Asia Minor and Egypt. Philip’s coinage was circulating in north and central Greece from 
his main mint at Pella.93 Amphipolis also became a major minting centre for Philip as it 
was close to the gold and silver mines and became favoured by Alexander for his 
universal coinage. In these hoard finds there is no evidence of Philip’s coinage imposing 
on the circulation of the Athenian currency.94 The situation changed dramatically and 
with great benefit for Athens when the Attic standard was adopted by Alexander over the 
Thracian weight standard. As Alexander moved into Asia the Attic standard gained a 
wider circulation and expanded inter-poleis trade. The silver mines of Laurium, the 
largest in central Greece, flourished as a consequence.    
The continuation of Athenian coinage would have aided Alexander’s demands under the 
League terms for soldiers and supplies for the campaign into Asia.  In comparison to other 
poleis, Athens had the capability to hire greater numbers of mercenaries through 
sufficient silver supplies.95  Many poleis were limited in manpower resources because of 
a lack of coinage.96 The upkeep of the large Macedonian army may have depleted Philip’s 
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reserves, an indication of which is given by Arrian who stated that Alexander inherited 
from his father ‘a few gold and silver cups and less than 60 talents’.97 However the output 
of the northern mines would have had the capacity to keep up with demand and therefore 
this may have been a solitary episode in Philip’s fiscal circumstance rather than a 
statement of the general condition. These factors indicate the recurring problem of coin 
circulation and supply.98  
Alexander also inherited the leadership of Philip’s professional Macedonian army. This 
force was supplemented by mercenaries who were plentiful throughout the Greek and 
barbarian territories after years of warfare. This form of soldiering would have become a 
career for many of those dispossessed or unable to sustain a living after the destruction of 
war on their poleis.  Isocrates made it clear that such manpower was readily available and 
highlighted the problem of the expense to the state of hiring mercenaries.99  There was 
also the consideration of the demands of feeding and maintaining troops for an 
unpredictable period of time while on campaign.  In Athens this may have become a 
liturgy obligation, possibly in the form of a proeisphora with a special commission set up 
for dealing with mercenaries.100  
Under these conditions it is likely that Greek mercenaries were dispatched to Alexander’s 
Asian campaign and were supplied with armour before they left Athens.101  For Athens 
this system would have had the benefit of fulfilling the League obligation to supply troops 
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to Asia and utilising surplus manpower in the polis.102  Aeschines established that 
mercenary soldiers were commonly dispatched when aid was required.  In his attack on 
the actions of Demosthenes, Aeschines asserted that Philip conquered the Greeks with 
ease at Chaeronea because Demosthenes had dispatched ten thousand mercenaries to aid 
the Amphissians.103  A speech of Demosthenes showed the common use of mercenaries 
as the bulk of the Athenian army and he suggested a smaller body of citizen soldiers 
should be employed as overseers.104 Plutarch described how the Greek states, when 
rallying against Philip, organised ‘a mercenary force of fifteen thousand foot and two 
thousand horse, apart from the citizen soldiery, and readily contributed money to pay 
them’.105 Arrian and Diodorus made a clear distinction in their works between the 
Macedonian army, mercenaries and Greek allies and it is likely that most of the mercenary 
soldiers in Philip’s Macedonian army were barbarians.106  This would allow for Greek 
mercenaries, including those sent from Athens, to be part of Arrian’s classification of 
allied troops. The large quota of mercenaries in the allied army was a major reason why 
the returning exiles created such a crisis for the polis under Alexander’s exiles decree of 
324.107 Alexander saw this as a way of eliminating the problem of itinerant demobilised 
mercenaries but for the receiving poleis it was an untenable population crisis.  
The payment methods devised between Athens and the Macedonian king for the supply 
of troops is still open to scholarly debate. The responsibility of paying and maintaining 
these troops while on campaign lay with Alexander.108 Arrian reported that payment was 
not a problem for Alexander as his treasury grew through plunder of Persian treasure. He 
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dismissed the troops of the League in Ecbatana with generous pay.109 His ability to 
continue to pay those who wished to continue as mercenaries in his army was confirmed 
by ‘the considerable number thus voluntarily enlisted’.110 The method of payment of 
troops at start of the Asian campaign is not clear. Although is it not entirely satisfactory 
to impose on the modus operandi of Alexander the methods of the armies in the third 
century, one aspect may be pertinent:  Inscription records show that if troops were 
requested from allies they were to be maintained by the sender for 30 days after which 
time the receiver would take over.111 This would seem to be a feasible method given the 
unprecedented nature of Alexander’s campaign across Asia.112  The Attic standard made 
universal by Alexander would have facilitated this method of maintaining allied troops 
on his Asian campaign if the troops were dispatched with a maintenance payment and 
armour.  
2.3 The ephebeia. 
Philip’s non-intervention on the right of the polis to defend itself, another crucial aspect 
of autonomy, aided the recovery of Athenian sovereignty.  Without the imposition of 
Macedonian garrisons, the Athenians were able to revitalise the ephebeia programme. 
This was an institution that not only created a prepared internal army but emphasised the 
importance of Athenian citizenship and was to have a considerable influence on economic 
stability.  
The sending of mercenaries to serve under Alexander may explain one reason for the 
ephebeia reforms. These reforms were not a direct response to the battle of Chaeronea 
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but were more likely a reaction to the troop deployment requirements in 335 on 
Alexander’s campaign.113 The reforms were probably encouraged by the shock felt after 
Alexander’s destruction of Thebes in 335.114 The enforcement of the institution during 
Alexander’s lifetime suggests it was a specific reaction to his demands on the polis.  The 
relative peace Athens experienced under the League of Corinth treaty enabled this 
institution to be successfully revived, a condition that was not possible in the political 
upheaval of the years preceding Chaeronea or those following the death of Alexander.115   
The Athenian ephebeia was revitalised under Epikrates and was an obligation to the state 
for Athenian males aged 18 to 20 as a compulsory full-time requirement for the military 
training of Athenian youths.116 This became more than the ‘rite of passage’ entry into 
manhood and registration of citizenship of the ephebeia of previous years. Entry into the 
institution became compulsory and the regulations regarding entry were strictly on dual 
Athenian parentage and established by membership of a phratry.117 This enforced the 
exclusivity of citizenship just as firmly as the dual parentage laws of 451/50 under 
Pericles.  After the death of Alexander the ephebeia became a privileged institution for 
the wealthy and eventually became voluntary.118   
As the institution had long been a part of the Athenian education system, it may not have 
been seen as a threat to the Macedonians, despite the new military focus.  The adaptation 
of the ephebeia as a military-focused obligation may even have been viewed as beneficial 
to Alexander who required skilled troops. The candidates were trained in hoplite warfare 
and ensured a capable army, which was a necessity to both the Macedonians and the 
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Athenians.  If Athens was to supply Alexander with troops, it was imperative that the 
Athenian forces were capable while on campaign in Asia. The ephebic oath, devised just 
before Macedonian hegemony, was still pertinent to warfare under a foreign ruler and 
retained its patriotic ethic, 
 I will not bring dishonour on my sacred arms nor will I abandon my comrade 
wherever I shall be stationed. I will defend the rights of gods and men and will 
not leave my country smaller, when I die, but greater and better, so far as I am 
able by myself and with the help of all. I will respect the rulers of the time duly 
and the existing ordinances duly and all others which may be established in the 
future. And if anyone seeks to destroy the ordinances I will oppose him so far as 
I am able by myself and with the help of all. I will honour the cults of my 
fathers.119 
The large percentage of Greek mercenaries fighting abroad on behalf of Athens allowed 
an internal force of trained citizen soldiers to ensure the vital requirements of the polis 
would be met.  These requirements were primarily to ensure the harvest was safely 
cultivated along with the protection of attic borders and harbours.120  The first year 
recruits were assigned guard duty at posts (phylakteria) in Munychia and Acte, which 
flanked the main harbour in the Piraeus.  The second year recruits, who were presumably 
more capable as protectors of the polis, patrolled the rural areas from inland and coastal 
fortress bases.121 Demades was in charge of the military fund between 334 and 330. While 
reflecting on his career he declared that he had ‘fortified Attica, encircling his boundaries, 
not with stone but with the safety of the city’.122 
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With this reinvigorated institution Athens had a highly trained home guard made up of 
citizen soldiers, with a loyalty to their city, an attribute not expected of the mercenary 
soldier. The efficiency of the training of the epheboi was realised after the death of 
Alexander when they showed superiority in their efforts against Antipater during the 
Lamian war. The League terms effectively created within Athens a prepared home guard 
to protect their polis and its democratic constitution whatever the outcome of the 
Macedonian campaign against the Great King.  
The Athenians had to adapt to the Macedonian means of warfare.  The Greek poleis had 
always conducted their campaigns, which tended to be short, around harvests and seasons 
suitable for sailing. This was aided by adherence to appropriately timed religious 
festivals. With the arrival of the Macedonian army into central Greece, warfare was no 
longer between citizen militia who played by the same rules.  Demosthenes condemned 
Philip’s methods of warfare in a comparison with Greek military traditions. He asserted 
that Philip did not comply with conventional Greek warfare in that he marched where he 
pleased without having to give consideration to alliances between neighbouring poleis. 
Philip would employ distance tactics with siege engines if he was not met in direct 
confrontation by a polis. Possibly the greatest complaint Demosthenes held against Philip 
was that he did not acknowledge a campaign season, which traditionally allowed the 
poleis to temporarily withdraw and recuperate.123  In adapting to the unprecedented 
military operation of Alexander, the Athenians developed the ephebeia institution and in 
doing so created a system that protected the polis and as a consequence was advantageous 
to the economic function of the polis.124  
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2.4. The Fleet. 
The terms of the League changed the demands of war on the Athenian polis. The distant 
warfare of Alexander’s Asian campaign was to a great extent an external problem to the 
Athenians. The League terms called for troops and ships to be dispatched as Philip 
required. Plutarch specified these demands as being for ‘triremes and horsemen’.125 The 
foot soldier may have been less of a demand in that, as already argued, a large quota was 
probably mercenary.  However, to supply cavalry was to take from the upper echelons of 
the Athenian army. The Macedonian army was heavily supported by cavalry units126 and 
the demands for hoplites from League states may have been a greater requirement for the 
Asian campaign. Movement of cavalry required the use of larger ships such as the 
quinqueremes. These super-galleys had the capacity to carry horses, a convenience that 
enabled the movement of livestock to mobilise a cavalry unit. Ships of various kinds were 
sent in convoy.127 This overcame the problem with the quinqueremes in that they were 
not able to negotiate some of the smaller harbours, which was a necessity for supplies to 
feed a large crew. 
The role of the Athenian fleet was not significant under Alexander’s Asian venture. There 
were only 20 Athenian triremes in Alexander’s League fleet of 160 triremes.128 Alexander 
disbanded the entire fleet early into his campaign.  According to Arrian this decision was 
because the combined naval force of Macedonian and Greek allies was no match for the 
Persian fleet.129 Alexander utilised an assembled fleet for his siege of Tyre but no 
Athenian vessels were employed for this major attack, which was executed from offshore 
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ships.130 This fleet was also employed to carry provisions to meet Alexander in Egypt.131 
As Alexander’s campaign moved inland there was no further need of the Athenian fleet 
in combat.  
The fleet was in good condition and had not suffered any damage in the sea-led campaigns 
before the battle of Chaeronea.  The Athenians renewed the infrastructure that funded the 
fleet and an imposing fleet was maintained throughout the era of Alexander’s campaign. 
The Athenians still maintained the fleet by liturgy although from 358/7 this was handled 
by a syntrierarchy,132 which relieved a single contributor but also allowed for a more 
substantial financial contribution.133 It still remained that the wealthiest Athenians 
undertook the trierarchy.  The law of Periander in 358/7 that reformed the trierarchy held 
that twelve hundred Athenians were liable for trierarchies.134  The reforms of 
Demosthenes in 340 narrowed the wealth criteria to the ‘three hundred richest persons’.135 
The syntrierarchy system complicated the original meaning of trierarch, which meant 
one who commands a trireme. This implied that a trierarch would sail with his ship for 
its duration at sea. A trierarch was obliged to undertake this liturgy for a period of one 
year and then be free of obligation for two years.136 Serving a trierarchy in person became 
a reason for self-praise in the law courts and was seen as patriotic, Appolodoros’ plea is 
an example.137 Demosthenes suggested that the term ‘contributor’ was preferred to 
trierarch.138 Gabrielson argued that a system developed whereby a trierarch did not 
always sail with his ship but put it in the hands of a contractor, who were often 
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foreigners.139  An indication that not all trierarchs sailed with their ships is evident in 
speeches.140  This enabled those who were obliged to fund the trierarchy to fulfil their 
duty but remain in the polis and at the heart of political life.  
An eisphora was imposed on metics from 347/6 to 323/2 for the building of the ship 
sheds141  and reforms relieved the syntrierarchy of the supply of equipment and crews, as 
this became a state responsibility.142 The detailed naval records of the 330s and 320s show 
the importance to the state of the upkeep of the fleet in this period.143 The council of the 
boule was obliged to keep the fleet size maintained by the construction of ships as decided 
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Year Triremes Quadriremes Quinqueremes Triaconters 





   








330 392 18   
323 315 50 7 9 
     
Fig. 1. Source: Gabrielson 1994: 127-128 figures derived using arithmos (sum total) formula; Rhodes 
1993: 546.  
 
This chart shows the trireme figures were within the norms of the fleet size in times of 
prosperity; however the speed of recovery from the post-Peloponnesian war was 
exceptional.  Gabrielson argues that ‘the 340s, 330s and 320s saw an unprecedented boost 
in the total number of ships’. This being ‘strongly corroborated by the increase in the 
number of ship-sheds’.145 Lycurgus recognised the essential role of the fleet and it is 
reported he organised the maintenance of 400 triremes in readiness for battle.146 
Demosthenes’ trierarchic reforms of 340 appear to have continued as the best method of 
funding the Athenian fleet. The syntrierarchy system remained in place and sustained an 
impressive fleet until 323/2.147  
The Athenians successfully adapted to a new regime and in doing so showed where their 
military superiority lay. The presence of larger ships is an indicator of the demands of a 
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new era. The terms of the League did not impact on the attention the Athenians gave to 
establishing a strong fleet. This rise and continuity of ship numbers does suggest that the 
Athenians were alert to, and prepared for, the necessity to employ a large naval exercise 
throughout the reign of Philip and Alexander.  
The continuation of Athenian coinage, the reforms of the ephebeia and the strong focus 
placed on sustaining the fleet were major factors in the rise of Athenian economic strength 
in this period. The importance of these aspects to economic survival is evident in that they 
were all under the control of the state rather than left to private enterprise.  Athens 
maintained control of her sovereignty within the restrictions of the demands of the 
Macedonian rulers but, as all poleis required interaction to fully function economically, 
the Athenians needed to interact with the wider Greek world.  This necessitated a review 
of foreign policies in light of Philip’s territorial adjustments, which challenged the 
traditional trading practices in Athens.  The following chapter analyses the Athenian 












The Athenian economy and the wider Greek world. 
 
The most significant economic change for Athens was brought about by the Macedonian 
domination of the northern Aegean and the Hellespont, which enabled access to the grain 
supply of the Bosporus region. The supply of grain remained as always, of upmost 
importance to the Athenians and they continued to rely on foreign imports. Demosthenes’ 
speech of 355 indicated that Athenian grain imports were high and mainly came from the 
Pontus, ‘now from the Bosporus there come to Athens four hundred thousand bushels’, 
which he stated amounted to ‘equal to the whole amount of all other places of export’.148 
Although his figures are subject to criticism, his speech does show that Black Sea grain 
and other foreign importers were necessary for the survival of the polis. Interruptions to 
grain shipments by blockades on access to the Hellespont had severely affected Athens. 
In 405 Athens was suppressed by the Spartan’s cutting them off from the Hellespont149 
and again in 376 another Spartan blockade was attempted.150 In 340 Athens had to 
intervene in Philip’s attempt to capture Byzantium as grain ships destined for the Piraeus 
were seized. This conflict ended the Peace of Philocrates, which had been devised in 346 
as a political compromise between Athens and Philip. 151 In 331 during Agis of Sparta’s 
revolt, once again grain ships were held until demands were met.152 Demosthenes’ 
hypothetical speech showed the insecurity for the polis if this crucial trading territory was 
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lost in his assertion that if Philip controlled Byzantine trade he would control all of 
Greece.153  The demands of war were aided by ransoming grain. In an age that came to 
be dominated historically by the campaigns of Alexander, the priority for the Athenians 
became, more than ever, to be concerned with food supply and economic stability.  
3.1. Food supply. 
Securing grain supplies was the true test of Athenian survival after Chaeronea.  Athenian 
imperialism was at an end with the domination of Philip.  The new political landscape 
created by the conquests of Philip and Alexander impacted on the traditional routes to 
acquiring grain. The Athenians, ever dependent on creating accessible trade routes, had 
in the past set up cleruchies in pertinent outposts. In the years 365/4, 361/0 and 352/1 
cleruchies were established on Samos.154 By the year 354/3 Athens had lost control of 
cleruchies bordering Macedonia when the Athenian outpost of Methone was taken by 
Philip. The loss of Amphipolis to Philip denied the Athenians access to the grain supplies 
of Thrace. In 353/2 and in 344/3 the Athenian’s established cleruchies further east in the 
Thracian Chersonese. This placed the Athenians in an important strategic position for 
involvement in Bosporan trading activity. Although the fate of the Chersonese cleruchies 
is not certain, Demosthenes claimed his administration secured the Chersonese as a route 
for safe passage of grain supplies.155  
Demosthenes also reported on the Bosporan King Leukon having opened a new corn 
depot at Theudosia (modern Kaffa, Crimea) to supply grain to Athens with the same 
exemptions as from the Bosporus.156 A decree of c.367 showed honours were granted to 
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Strato the King of Sidon for enabling Greek ambassadors’ safe journey into the non-
Hellenised area of inland Asia.  The honours were expressed as privileges being granted 
to Sidonian merchants trading in Athens.157 In the period after the battle of Chaeronea 
imports from the south east and even from the west are evident.158 Grain was also sourced 
around the 330s from Egypt and Sicily.159 This would be consistent with the Athenian 
currency distribution.160  
The benefits of seeking to secure a stable grain supply from the west lay not in better 
climate conditions but in moving away from the areas dominated by the Macedonians.161 
The expedition to the Adriatic in 325/4 is often highlighted as an anti-piracy exercise to 
secure grain routes.  Just as importantly the expedition was to set up a cleruchy with the 
aim to export a consistent supply of grain to Athens. The decree announcing the 
expedition stated ‘in order that the people may for all future time have their own 
commerce and transport in grain’.162  As Alexander looked toward the east, so Athens 
looked to the west.  
The League of Corinth Treaty allowed Athens control of some crucial Greek territory, 
which facilitated trade. Philip’s agenda in giving Athens the island territories may have 
been to accommodate the sending of soldiers and warships to aid his campaign. The 
islands were stepping stones to Asia Minor, useful for the dispatch and provisions for 
troops and triremes to the Macedonian campaign, but the Athenians also relied on their 
islands for grain production and to facilitate trading routes.163 Under Athenian law the 
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island cleruchies were compelled by law to import grain only to Athens,164 which 
presumably restricted the use of the islands as trading posts for other Greek poleis. 
However, the island settlements strengthened the Athenian trading options with foreign 
importers in the east.  This was an essential trading link as Athens was no longer reliant 
on tribute from the poleis of the Delian League or from the subsequent Second Athenian 
Confederacy. It was also beneficial for Alexander to have the islands under Athenian 
control as the success of his campaign along the coast of Asia Minor would have been 
compromised if the islands were not in the hands of a League ally. This became evident 
when a Persian fleet harboured for provisions at Samos and created conflict between 
Alexander and the Athenians. Alexander took the episode as an opportunity to suggest a 
serious breach of the League terms by the Athenians.165  
After Chaeronea and the demise of the Second Athenian Confederacy, an important 
means of revenue for Athens came from harbour taxes. The terms of the League of 
Corinth protected the use of harbours.166 Thucydides reported on the financial difficulty 
experienced in Athens after the devastation of the Decelean war, ‘it was about this time 
that they imposed upon their subjects a tax of five per cent on all imports and exports by 
sea, thinking this would bring in more money’.167 This emergency proposal was extreme 
in comparison to the 1% harbour tax of the fifth century, which was sufficient when 
combined with payments from tributary poleis.168 In the 330s a more reasonable 2% tax 
was levied on trade in the Piraeus.169  This would comply with the desire of the Athenians 
to encourage trade in the longer term rather than a short term revenue boost.  
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Other harbours in territories allocated to Athens by Philip enhanced trade in the east and 
to the south. Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros had always had strategic use as trade routes 
from the Black Sea. The harbour at Oropus, which became part of Attica after Chaeronea, 
facilitated the traditional trade route from Skyros to Euboea.170 Delos could have been a 
serious opponent to the harbour at Piraeus if Philip had not allocated its administration to 
Athens. Although the harbour at Delos was not as large or as accessible as that in Piraeus, 
it was in a strategic position for trade with Egypt or Rhodes. The Lycurgan administration 
in Athens organised developments to the harbour at Piraeus and it became an important 
facility for housing the fleet and accommodating trade.171 Adhering to the terms of 
Macedonian rule the Piraeus developed to become an important trade centre for central 
Greece. The grain from the harbour of Piraeus was probably traded in the south as Salamis 
appears to have remained under Athenian dominion172until 318 when the island came 
under Macedonian control.173  
The distribution of grain on the Greek mainland was aided by the demise of major warfare 
between poleis, stipulated under the League conditions,  
nor take up arms for harm against any of those who abide by the oaths neither by 
land nor by sea; nor shall I take any city or guard-post nor harbour, for war, of 
any of those participating in the peace.  
 
Local grain production benefitted from relative stability in Attica as the region was 
unaffected by Alexander’s distant campaign. The destruction of war affected the 
livelihoods of the Attic farmers. The olive industry was particularly vulnerable in warfare 
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through the destruction of olive trees, which were slow to regrow. However, Athenian 
agricultural land was unharmed as the battle of Chaeronea was sufficiently distant from 
Attica.174 At meetings of the Assembly the protection of Attica was considered of equal 
importance as that of grain supply.175 From the 330s generals were appointed to specific 
details of internal defence. Their duties included policing with ‘full power to arrest a 
disobedient man’.176 The inland borders and sea ports were under the protection of the 
Epheboi, who patrolled from garrisons in Attica.177 Their duties were carried out under 
the Ephebic oath, which was sworn on that which was most precious to Athens, ‘the 
boundaries of my fatherland, wheat, barley, vines, olives, figs’.178 This structure gave 
Attic farmers a level of security in an environment that had always been precariously 
exposed to the front line of inter-poleis warfare.  
 
As a large Greek contingent of mercenaries was sent to Asia to fulfil Alexander’s 
demands, the citizen body could function in the primary occupation of agriculture. 
Mercenary soldiers would probably not have had ties to the land in Athens. Oropus was 
in Athenian hands from 337, which extended Attic grain production. In addition the 
destruction of Thebes under Alexander in 335 saw an expansion of the western border of 
Attica as Theban land was utilised. Demosthenes and his adversary Dinarchus both 
remark on this aspect of the fate of Thebes.  Demosthenes declared to the Athenians, 
‘Poor Thebans…you who till the farms that once were theirs’.179 Dinarchus lamented that 
‘the site of Thebes is being ploughed and sown’.  
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The food producers of Attica were essential for polis survival but they could not fully 
meet the needs of the Athenian population.  Athenian economic policies had always been 
reactionary and inspired by necessity rather than long-term economic potential. They 
were amended according to such factors as war or harsh climate.180 In the fourth century 
the slow process of amending laws181 was relieved by the swifter method of proposing 
decrees. An innovation of the mid-fourth century hastened proposed changes to 
legislation by a restructure of the process by the Ekklesia.182 As Philip became involved 
in affairs in central Greece the Athenians showed an awareness of the importance of 
protecting their food supplies. The attempt by Leptines in 356/5 to remove the perpetuity 
clause in honorary decrees to foreign suppliers addressed the problem of Athenian grants 
being exploited by regime changes of foreign suppliers.  The foreign benefactors, if no 
longer enjoying perpetual privileges must earn their honours rather than hold Athens to a 
long-term obligation.183 After the battle of Chaeronea, Athenian foreign policy became 
concerned with procuring a sufficient food supply for the polis. These policies were 
concerned with mercantile law, shipping loans and with a new focus on encouraging 
foreign traders into Athens.184  
3.2. Honours for trade. 
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The necessity for consistent grain supplies into the polis created a new system of alliances 
for Athens, this time with foreign merchants.185 In the fourth century a reciprocal system 
had developed with conspicuous honours and civic privileges, such as exemptions 
(ateleia) from taxes and liturgies. Confined by the terms of the League, Athens was no 
longer able to manipulate other states into supplying food and instead they secured long-
term crucial supplies, particularly timber and grain186 by offering such privileges.  In 
return foreign merchants such as the Bosporan Kings, Leukon and Pairisades encouraged 
trade to Athens and waived export duty on traders dealing with the polis.187 Demosthenes 
showed in his speech of 327/6 that a Greek presence was firmly established in the 
‘barbarian’ Bosporus region. Phormio’s business partner spent the winter there and the 
mention of harbour officials indicated that a similar administrative system was in place 
as that employed in Athens.188 The links to the Black Sea were evidently still strong 
among old alliances.189 After 355/4 honours were more frequently given for trade 
services.190 This was at the end of the Third Social War, which saw Philip firmly 
entrenched in Greek affairs.191 Although the granting of honours had developed before 
Philip’s ascendency in the Greek world, eighteen of the twenty three known honours 
concerning food supply came after 338.192  
The reliance on foreign imports made Athens vulnerable and the approach to foreign 
benefactors was crucial.  The Athenians placed restrictions on privileges handed out to 
foreign benefactors, which held a check on how far the foreign trader could engage in 
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Athenian affairs. This established Athenian citizenship as the highest honour and a 
worthwhile pursuit. Philip and Alexander were both awarded Athenian citizenship, which 
presumably put a greater value on the honour in the eyes of the foreign benefactors.193 
The motivation for this honour may have been to establish the Macedonian kings as 
worthy adversaries to lessen the impact of defeat after the battle of Chaeronea.  Also, in 
giving the honour of citizenship, the Athenians could claim to be on equal terms with the 
Macedonian conquerors.   
To some extent the honours to foreign merchants were the same as those given to 
honoured Athenians such as a special seat in the theatre, banquets or the trierarch’s gold 
crown.194 Privileges came in the form of full or partial citizenship rights such as enktesis, 
which allowed the recipient to own land in Attica.195 A speech of Demosthenes suggests 
that the right of inter-marriage was also offered as enktesis, in this case in an alliance pact 
with Thebes.196 Further privileges were in the form of exemption from liturgies such as 
choregia or eisphorai, which relieved the benefactor from costly involvement in a vital 
part of polis revenue creation.197 Leptine’s law challenged such privileges toward foreign 
benefactors (euergetai) or their representatives (proxenoi) and sought to abolish ateleia 
to honorands.198 This imbalance of reciprocity would have been detrimental to Athens as 
it had the potential to strengthen the role of the foreign benefactor.  As Demosthenes 
pointed out to his Athenian audience, Leukon, and his son Pairisades, continued to grant 
exemption to Bosporan traders who exported to Athens despite the Athenians only 
offering them limited privileges.199 The significant loss of the one-thirtieth tax on 
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Bosporan exports showed that the Bosporan kings considered the benefits with Athens to 
be worthwhile.200 If the Athenians supported Leptine’s law to remove ateleia then they 
would have become precariously dependent on the Bosporan rulers continued 
benefaction.201 Without sufficient privileges from Athens, Leukon and his successors 
could withdraw their benefaction or bestow it as a political weapon thereby giving them 
control over the Athenians. Although the decrees on both sides offered honours in 
perpetuity, it would seem that on the part of the benefactor the rules could change 
regarding Athens.  Pairisades’ issued a decree announcing tax exemption on exports to 
Athens in 327. This may indicate a break in the perpetuity clause that saw the necessity 
for Pairisades to re-establish this scheme.202 Evidently the Athenians needed to secure a 
delicate balance to ensure reciprocity with foreign trading allies.  
The law of Leptines showed limited concern for the true value of foreign benefactors to 
Athens and was probably motivated solely by a need for revenue.  Demosthenes’ appeal 
of Leptines law was proposed in 355, the era of Philip’s involvement in central Greece. 
It was also the period that saw the demise of the Second Athenian Confederacy. Philip’s 
destruction of Olynthus in 348 may have been significant motivation for Athens to give 
such honours to Bosporan benefactors as Philip’s advance toward the Hellespont was of 
great concern to the Athenians. An inscription of 347/6 shows that by this time considered 
attention had been given to the importance of a careful balance of honours with the foreign 
grain providers.203 and an awareness of the need for strong economic alliances.  
The decree of 347/6 was to acknowledge the continued benefaction of the Bosporan rulers 
and was set up on a marble stele in the Piraeus. Athenian decrees announcing privileges 
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to foreign benefactors were set up in prominent ports.204 This not only served to encourage 
others to do the same, but also showed an Athenian presence beyond the boundary of the 
astu where decrees would traditionally have been displayed.205 The pertinence of 
displaying inscriptions in the Piraeus, the commercial centre of Athens, was to affirm the 
commercial agreement made with the polis and it probably aided the administrative 
process for the traders.206  With hostels, an agora207 and grain officials established in the 
Piraeus, it would seem that foreign traders were not encouraged to venture further into 
Athens than the mercantile area. The sources suggest that courts were located in the 
harbours for various types of litigation.208 This containment of foreigners to the Piraeus 
would have aided the protection of Attica and enhanced the reputation of the Piraeus as a 
thriving port, which, in turn, would encourage more traders.  
Macedonian domination forced a new emphasis on the Athenians approach to foreign 
traders and there was a notable shift in the language used in trade decrees. By the mid 
fourth century the language once used for military and political services was being applied 
to foreign trade services.209 Philotimia was expressed in decrees to foreigners from 352/1 
up to 337/6.210   This indicated that the honorand held highly ‘the love of honour’ as a 
return for their benefaction, It had always been the aspiration of the Athenian citizen to 
achieve Philotimia in a competitive society.  As the necessity for foreign trade grew, the 
term was used to encourage foreign benefactors and entice them with the promise of 
honours but in the knowledge that they would remain on the outside of Athenian 
society.211  The more equivocal epithet Chresimos, meaning ‘useful’ first appeared for 
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trade related services from 337/6.212  The language used in decrees had connotations for 
the Athenian democratic institution and was carefully considered.  The term Chrestoi 
(good men) was an epithet of the old Athenian aristocracy and therefore it was not lightly 
used to praise an individual in a democracy.  However, after Chaeronea it was applied to 
foreign traders. This demonstrated that while expression on decrees was treated with 
caution, in the period after Chaeronea aristocratic terminology had been diverted to use 
outside of the polis. This served to dilute its meaning as an indicator for differences 
between aristocracy and democracy within Athens.  The decree terminology used for 
foreign benefactors placed egalitarian meaning on terms that were once considered 
aristocratic and in doing so reinforced democratic values in Athens.   
The attention given to the role of foreign benefactors by Athens during the 330s was to 
continue after the death of Alexander. The diadochoi of Alexander relied on a network of 
benefactors as an entourage of ‘friends’ to enable control of vast areas and it became the 
system of administration that defined the Hellenistic age.213  Euergetism came to replace 
the liturgical system in the Hellenistic age.214  Benefactors could claim their actions were 
altruistic and thereby gain greater accolade than the liturgy system which was a duty 
compelled by law.215 This concept was aided by the use of the epithet eunoia (goodwill) 
on trade related decrees, a term which indicated altruism as motivation.216 
3.3. Local food production. 
There was a certain amount of self-sufficiency in local grain production. This was not 
interrupted by Macedonian domination and Philip’s territorial arrangement held some 
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benefit for local food providers. The allocation of Oropus to Athens under Philip’s terms 
opened up access to the fertile plains of Euboea and as part of Attica it added to the grain 
yield for Athens.217 Philip’s allocation to the Athenians of some of the larger islands in 
the Aegean was of great benefit as they were able to grow significant yields of crops.  
Lemnos in particular produced high quality wheat with a reasonably high yield.  Although 
it is difficult to gauge the productivity of the islands, it can be established that Salamis, 
Imbros, Skyros and Lemnos produced reasonable quantities of wheat and barley.  This is 
evident from a law of 374/3 that was devised to deal with transporting grain from the 
islands as a form of tax.218 This would suggest these islands had consistent supplies that 
were crucial to Athens. Attica also produced barley and wheat219 and, as previously 
commented on, its borders were extended after the destruction of Thebes in 335.    
Year 329/8 Attica Lemnos Skyros Imbros Salamis Oropus 
Med. Of 
Wheat 
39,112 56,750 9,600 44,200  6,900 
Med. Of 
Barley 
363,400 248,525 28,800 26,000 24,525 12,000 
Total grain 402,512 305,275 38,400 70,200 24,525 18,900 
Fig. 2. Grain production in year 329/8 - Source I.G. ii2 1672, Eleusis First Fruits inscription.220 
The table above shows high production levels of barley but this was considered a food 
for animals or the poor and grew better in a season with higher rainfall.221 This would 
indicate that this particular year was not a good one for a beneficially balanced crop, 
although barley must have been a suitable alternative for all consumers in times of poor 
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harvest.222 The fluctuation of yields of barley and wheat in other territories and climates 
would have ensured a thriving business network of imports into Athens.  The food 
shortages in Athens of the 330s were not necessarily due to climate-related crop failure 
as their benefactors were able to supply all of Athens’ needs when there was a ‘universal 
shortage’.223  The lack of supply may have been partly due to transportation being 
disrupted by war.  The Bosporus supply, a region highly suited to grain growth, was 
subject to such disruption in localised warfare.224  
Further securities were put in place to secure efficiency in supplies and distribution to 
Athens in the form of a revision of administrative posts. In the 330s the issue of food 
supply was a high priority at the assembly meetings.225 There was a substantial adjustment 
of the role of the corn officials.  The number of grain guardians (sitophulakes) was 
expanded from ten to thirty five to oversee the city and the Piraeus.  Their task was to 
ensure the fair sale of grain from its origin as raw corn through to the miller and bread 
seller.  The bread was subject to a weight standard. In the corn market ten commissioners 
(sitonai) were appointed to ensure the dealers engaged in fair exchange and allocated a 
2/3 distribution to the city.226 The role of the sitophulakes was not an innovation of the 
period but they were the only officials concerned with weight standards and commercial 
issues to have their roles so significantly enlarged in this period.227 The trade and 
distribution of the Athenian food supply was a state concern and, under Macedonian 
domination in a changing economic landscape, it was vital to impose these strict 
regulations.  
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Another significant and essential import to Athens was in products relating to trireme 
production. Ship building required skilled workers and was an on-going business as, from 
the 350s onwards, the maintenance of fleet size was a primary concern for the polis.228 
Ship building was an important aspect of self-sufficiency and a large fleet was a symbol 
of power for the Athenians. A decree of 325/4 to establish a colony in the Adriatic gives 
an inventory of naval equipment and accounts for losses of worm-eaten oars.229 It could 
be assumed then that hulls also suffered such wear and tear.230 Ships were also lost or 
damaged at sea. Bissa calculates that for the second half of the fourth century it was 
necessary to construct eighteen new ships annually.231  However, pitch and timber were 
commodities not readily available to the Athenians. Traditionally these supplies came 
from the extensive forests of Macedonia and Thrace.232  
The new regime of Macedonian domination created the need for a new source of timber 
and pitch. Thucydides related how the loss of Amphipolis to Brasidas was devastating to 
the Athenians as it had cut them off from an important source ‘because it supplied timber 
for shipbuilding and brought in revenue’.233 The port at Amphipolis had been an 
important colony for the Athenians234 and was central to Macedonia and Thrace, both of 
which were significant suppliers of timber.235  Xenophon stated in the 370s that Macedon 
was where the Athenians got their timber.236  Demosthenes reiterated this in 336 with his 
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comment on the abundance of Macedonian timber that had been, ‘cheap for all who want 
it’.237 Philip’s domination of the northern Aegean made sourcing timber problematic for 
the Athenians.  
Theophrastos, however, described other areas where timber was sourced,  
Again it is only a narrow extent of country which produces wood fit for 
shipbuilding at all, namely in Europe, the Macedonian region, and certain parts of 
Thrace and Italy; in Asia, Cilicia, Sinope and Amisus, and also the Mysian 
Olympus, and Mount Ida;  but in these parts it is not abundant.  For Syria has 
Syrian cedar, and they use this for their galleys.238  
Different locations offered various types of timber considered suitable for triremes, 
mainly silver-fir, fir, cedar and pine.239 Alexander’s advance into Asia Minor and Syria 
may have temporarily disrupted sourcing timber in these areas. However, after the initial 
conflict, Alexander left his conquered territories to function as before and the local trade 
continued. Notably, with the Adriatic expedition in mind, quality timber was available in 
Corsica, Latium and the Italian south.240 According to Thucydides, Alcibiades recognised 
the potential in a conquest of Italy which was ‘rich in timber’241 and in the fifth century 
Athens had formed a good trading relationship with southern Italy.242  
There was limited availability in Athens for the supply of items vital for the continuation 
of ship building.  These were copper for ships rams, tin, ruddle and resin for hulls, papyrus 
and hemp for ropes and sails. Ruddle was sourced and monopolised on the island of Kea 
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to the south of Attica and the materials for sails and ropes came primarily from Egypt.243 
These necessities would have created a continuous trade south of Athens. Trade with 
Egypt would have been aided by the building of Alexandria, which Alexander founded 
in 331.244 This great trade-oriented city was created to facilitate Greek and Egyptian 
traditions and trade was an essential form of communication between the two cultures.  
3.5. Piracy  
The League of Corinth addressed the issue of piracy, ‘for the compact, of course, provides 
that all the parties to the peace may sail the seas and that none may hinder them or force 
a ship of any of them to come to harbour’.245 These were the common problems of sea-
trading.246 This clause was not unusual, the Peace of Philocrates, as an example, also had 
an anti-piracy clause.  Post-Chaeronea, piracy was, more than ever, a problem to be 
addressed for the Athenians.247 Even after the formation of the League the important trade 
routes to the Black Sea ‘remained vulnerable’.248 The loss of the northern Athenian 
cleruchies and the consequential loss of control of the sea in the northern Aegean would 
have been a major concern for traders from the Bosporus. The necessity of sending fast 
ships to protect against pirates as late as 325/4 showed that it was still a significant 
problem and not one that could be resolved under the League.249   
In this light, adding the clause against acts of piracy seems futile but Philip may have 
been addressing Athens in particular with the anti-piracy clause. The Athenian fleet was 
substantial and triremes were employed to convoy and protect trade ships. The Athenians 
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still held a dominant presence on the seas.250 Demosthenes was affronted that Philip 
would join Athens in policing the seas thereby putting him on an equal status of maritime 
authority.251 In the previous century Athenian thalassocracy had enabled Athens to 
control all inter-poleis sea trade and claimed the authority to forbid exports to Athens’ 
enemies.252 The Athenians were as guilty of piracy as any other Greek state, not least 
Philip himself of which Demosthenes accused him for financing his wars.253  
As piracy could not be sufficiently controlled, the role of the Athenian fleet as trade 
protection is a reasonable assumption.254 It was customary in peace time for merchant 
ships to be accompanied by warships and in time of war, when warships were utilised 
elsewhere, merchant ships were particularly vulnerable.255 As the large Athenian fleet 
was not essential to Alexander’s campaign, it was available to protect merchant vessels. 
The deep-based commercial ships, unlike warships, required ballast for outward 
journeys256 and were therefore constantly susceptible to pirate raids. Sea protection, 
honours for trade and appealing conditions in the Piraeus accommodated foreign 
merchants and facilitated their transactions with Athens. In the era of Macedonian 
domination the particular focus on drawing traders into Athens had repercussions on the 
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After the establishment of the League of Corinth there was a particular focus on 
commercial activity in Athens in recognition of the instability in obtaining food supplies 
and the importance of encouraging trade.257 Foreign traders were accommodated in 
hostels set up for them in the Piraeus and the docks were improved to facilitate 
merchants.258 Adaptations within the Athenian constitution toward the logistics of food 
supplies saw a revision of commercial law. Demosthenes’ speeches contain examples of 
the complexities of commercial contracts.259 The Athenians themselves were subject to 
laws concerning grain supplies, which demanded that their grain was delivered only to 
the Piraeus with severe penalty for law-breakers.260 In the period of economic uncertainty 
before Chaeronea, Athens had put in place institutional changes focusing on the needs of 
merchants, primarily, a specific commercial court (dikai emporikai). This was established 
to facilitate the swift settlement of affairs between traders.261 Metics, vital to trade, were 
given equal status in commercial transactions as that of Athenian citizen’s and they no 
longer needed a citizen patron (prostates) to represent them in the courts.262  The courts 
gave priority to those involved in commercial transactions to speed up weather-dependent 
trading negotiations.263 The process was aided by the addition of five new eisagogeis 
magistrates in the 330s that were designated to financial cases.264 These changes indicated 
the importance of a swift resolution to trading and financial issues. It was unprecedented 
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in this period that these courts were open to both citizen and non-citizen alike with cases 
brought before the thesmothetai.265 Although this would appear to show a loosening of 
the demarcation between citizen and metic,266 there were still social and political 
indicators that differentiated the status of metic from that of the citizen.  
3.7. Metics. 
The Athenians had always accommodated foreign visitors to the polis as they were an 
essential part of its economic function.267 The enfranchisement of metics was another 
emergency measure proposed in the turmoil after Chaeronea.  Lycurgus emphasised the 
outrageous nature of such an event,  
the sight which would most surely have stirred the onlooker and moved him to 
tears over the sorrows of Athens was to see the people vote that slaves should be 
released, that aliens should become Athenians and the disfranchised regain their 
rights.268   
As with other extreme proposals, this was rejected when it was realised that Philip’s 
approach was not one of destruction. The polis depended on specific distinctions between 
citizen and non-citizen. The breakdown of this distinction is often seen as the cause of the 
demise of the polis in the Hellenistic period.269 However, this was probably more to do 
with mass migration to the new cities of the Hellenistic Kings.  In the period 338 to 323 
there remained clear distinctions of citizen status enhanced by the legalised and controlled 
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system of honours.  It was only with the rise of private social clubs that a blurring of status 
was accepted.270  
The metic tax (metoikion) distinguished the metics from citizens and was an important 
source of revenue but also served as a stamp of metic status. The penalty for defaulting 
on the metoikion was severe because it merged the distinction between metic and 
citizen.271  Citizenship was rarely granted and was given to those who could be of benefit 
to the polis, particularly financially.  A privilege for a metic would be equality of taxation 
(isoteleia), which no longer required him to pay the metoikion.272 The greater aspiration 
would probably have been for equal rights (isopoliteia) with Athenians giving metics an 
opportunity for political contribution.273  Those metics who were isoteleis still remained 
distinct from the status of the Athenian citizen.274   
In the wake of Philip’s destruction in the northern Aegean and Alexander’s razing of 
Thebes, a consistent flow of exiles would have migrated to Athens.  As Athens was free 
of Macedonian garrisons and was functioning economically it would have been a 
sanctuary for the dispossessed. The problem with these foreign exiles entering Athens 
was in the allocation of metic status.  Those who are just passing through or briefly 
visiting were xenos. A metic was a foreigner who stayed a certain length of time in Athens 
and became liable for the metoikion tax.275 There was a temporary tax-free period where 
he was known as paraepidemos.276 The implication here is that the metic had the means 
to earn a living in Athens in order to be able to contribute to this tax and that the metics 
had a home polis to return to although many stayed for good in Athens.  Those exiled by 
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war with Philip had nowhere to return to and probably no means to support the metoikion 
payment. The fate of these refugees was because of the political relationship of Athens 
with Philip and so Athens could hardly refuse them sanctuary.  The exiles from Olynthus 
were offered privileged status by Athens.277 This was a grant offered to the whole city 
rather than an individual and relieved them of the obligation to pay metoikion.278 The 
Theban exiles were only given refuge when permission was granted by Alexander, who 
had demanded that Thebans be extradited from other poleis after he razed Thebes. The 
destruction of Thebes was a stern reminder to the Athenians as to who was in control and 
the deference to Alexander as hegemon was seen when the Athenians sought his 
permission to receive exiled Thebans.  
Lycurgus, in his policy to boost revenue in Athens, had set up appealing conditions to 
encourage metics. Further to the commercial adaptations in Athens, under Lycurgus’ 
administration foreigners in Athens were encouraged to observe their own religious 
cults.279 Lycurgus extended the right of enktesis to foreign merchants, so that they could 
worship their particular gods. Lycurgus in 333 proposed a decree allowing Kition traders 
to build a sanctuary to Aphrodite.280 In classical Athens the right to own land was a 
privilege of the citizen. The acquisition of Athenian land by foreign traders would have 
been a notable privilege. The land had a designated purpose and was not for agricultural 
use or considered a home.  This distinction clarified the social division between foreigner 
and citizen281 as the foreigner rented a home and did not till the land. Lycurgus’ proposal 
had precedent as the same inscription shows that Egyptians had acquired the same honour 
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to build a sanctuary to Isis, probably also facilitated by Lycurgus.  In adding this reference 
to the Egyptians, Lycurgus indicated the unusual nature of the honour.  
It is notable that the Kitions were from Cyprus, an island which enabled access to trade 
in Syria. Egypt and Syria were trading areas of great interest to the Athenians at this time 
as Alexander moved into Asia Minor.  The siting of the decree in the Piraeus 
acknowledged the status of the Kitions as foreign traders. Alexander recognised the 
importance of accommodating all religious cults when he founded Alexandria in 331. 
Like Lycurgus, he, too, created an environment suitable for indigenous Egyptians and 
‘foreign’ Greeks to observe their own religion. The openness toward the establishment of 
foreign cults remained into the Hellenistic period.282 This practice was key to the success 
of the Hellenistic cities which saw migrating Greeks amalgamate the gods of the east with 
the traditional Olympian gods.  
As previously remarked upon, the cult of Demokratia was revived in the 340s and its 
resurgence in Athens correlated with the domination of Philip. There were many ships 
named Demokratia and statues and steles depicted the image. Rows of seats in the theatre 
were dedicated to the priests of the cult.283 The foreign traders from Greek poleis 
worshipped gods familiar to the Athenians, as is evident in the Kition reverence of 
Aphrodite. The Athenian’s obvious display of Demokratia created a contrast that 
differentiated them.  The cult of Demokratia was based in the agora 284 but was visible 
all around the polis and on the sea, the foreign cults were confined to the trading areas. In 
the same year as the decree privileging the Kitions, a statue to Demokratia was erected 
by the Boule.  This was at the time Alexander was reorganising the constitutions of the 
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cities of Asia Minor.  The link between these two events has been analysed285, however 
it is also likely that the dedication to Demokratia was to balance Lycurgus’ 
encouragement of foreign cults.  
Economics and citizenship were to become combined in the era of the diadochoi when 
citizenship could be purchased and the concept of the cosmopolis emerged.  The 
forerunner for this change came about in the 340s and 330s with the community of Greek 
merchants who advanced the concept of a cosmopolitan community. This process was 
aided by the new mercantile laws, the merging of cults and the potential to gain privileges 
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The sources from the mid-fourth century offer those who wish to investigate the period a 
great resource in the literary evidence of the law court speeches. There is also a significant 
wealth of information in the epigraphical evidence of decrees, not only in their wording 
but in their physical location. Where archaeological evidence does not exist the works of 
the orators come to the fore.   
Beyond their propaganda, these forms of evidence substantiate the view of a changing 
Greek world at the time of Philip’s involvement in Greek affairs in this period. A study 
of Athens under Macedonian domination does not give a generalised view of Greece.  
Athens had more to lose by entering into the treaty of the League of Corinth as the polis 
had dominated Greek affairs both before and after the Peloponnesian War. The ability to 
recover successfully from the Peloponnesian War added to the prestige of Athens and 
may have been one factor that accounted for Philip’s leniency.   
The Peloponnesian War and its aftermath taught the Athenians some harsh lessons, which 
they drew upon when dealing with the might of the Macedonian kings.  The problems 
that had subdued Athens after the Peloponnesian War lay in the overturn of the 
constitution and the denial of sovereignty in such areas as minting and civic defence. 
These were the internal institutions that concerned the Athenians under Macedonian 
domination.  It was only Philip’s leniency that made this pursuit of sovereignty possible. 
Philip and Alexander stayed on the periphery of the world of the common Athenian. 
Philip had never stood in Athens and Alexander only once as an envoy.  Through the 
words of the orators the Athenians were presented with a picture of their Macedonian 
dominators. Philip’s advance across the northern Aegean impacted on the Athenians who 
engaged with him through diplomatic means.  When diplomacy failed they prepared for 
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battle but were unprepared for the might of Philip and his army. The Athenian reaction to 
Macedonian domination can be best viewed from the aftermath of the battle of Chaeronea.  
The reports of Philip’s destruction on northern poleis were reported to the Athenians in 
the midst of the post-battle turmoil.  The panic after the battle of Chaeronea is an 
indication of how unprepared the Athenians were for defeat. Perhaps they were over-
confident about a land battle on their own ground.   
Defeated at Chaeronea and with the Macedonian army on their doorstep, the Athenians 
were not in a position to negotiate with Philip, and he dictated the terms to settle affairs 
and in doing so enforced his authority. Subjugation of the Athenians seemed complete 
under Philip’s terms. The League of Corinth effectively put an end to the Second Athenian 
Confederacy. The terms of the League distinguished the member poleis both territorially 
and politically and restrained them from interfering in each other’s internal affairs.  
After her defeat the priorities for Athens were to re-establish defences and source food 
supplies. The Athenians made the best of the restrictions placed on them by the 
Macedonian Kings. The allocation of territory and lessons learned in the past were 
primary factors in the successful revival of the polis. The lost territory in the northern 
Aegean put a demand on the Athenians resourcefulness in accessing crucial supplies such 
as timber and grain. The Athenians focused on nurturing foreign trade relations and 
creating physical and legal structures within Athens to facilitate merchants.  The territory 
allocated to Athens by Philip after Chaeronea limited the Athenian political influence in 
the Greek world. Philip’s intention may have been to use the islands to facilitate the 
movement of troops to Asia.  However, it also enabled the economic development of 
Athens. The rise of the cult of Demokratia and the ephebic oath established that the 
emphasis on democratic values was not incidental to the adaptation but was a definite 
response to interaction with foreign traders and the Macedonian rulers.  
61 
 
The political success of Athens under Macedonian domination showed that the polis was 
strengthened by involvement in the League.  The enforced focus on internal affairs 
created by the League terms allowed Athens to recover her former glory with an 
impressive fleet and economic strength, facilitated by the developed harbour and adapted 
mercantile laws. The relationship between Athens and the Macedonians was defined by 
the observance of the League terms.  When Alexander dismissed the League troops in 
Ecbatana, the League could have been dismissed by both parties.  The testimony of the 
benefit of the League to the Athenians lies in the fact that institutional practices such as 
the ephebeia and syntrierarchy continued until the death of Alexander. 
Just as the Athenians relied on past experience, particularly the effect on the polis of the 
Decelean war, they also had an imprint on the new world after the death of Alexander as 
the diadochoi changed the political landscape. Athenian reactionary policies developed 
some of the key cultural institutions that defined the Hellenistic age after the death of 
Alexander. These were such as euergetism replacing liturgies, which developed in the 
network of benefactors to the Hellenistic kings. The new cities built in the various 
territories of the diadochoi required an amalgamation of cultures of the east and west. 
This served to placate the indigenous people and encourage the Greek settlers.  The 
Athenian extension of enktesis honours to foreign traders was the fore-runner of this 
concept as Athens placed a greater focus on the role of metics in commerce. Alexander 
also created an environment that encouraged cultural and economic interaction in 
Alexandria, which benefitted the Athenian economy. 
The Hellenistic age is defined by the spread of Greek culture across the non-Greek 
territories of the diadochoi. Alexander’s expedition into unknown territory is seen as the 
beginning of the cultural interaction that made the Hellenistic cities successful.  It should 
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also be acknowledged that Athens under Macedonian domination established the 
institutional practices that enabled the new regimes after Alexander to flourish.  
The full impact of Macedonian rule over Athens cannot be assessed in comparison with 
an alternative event.  There are too many unknowns.  What if Philip had treated Athens 
as he did Thebes? If the League of Corinth had not been devised, would inter-poleis 
warfare have put huge demands on the Athenian economy? How politically and 
economically strong would Athens have become if Alexander had lived on and fulfilled 
his ambitions? Even within the League of Corinth there was no assurance for Athens.  
The outcome of the Macedonian campaign into Asia could not be known. The 
repercussions of Persian retaliation if Alexander was defeated would reverberate back to 
the League members as Macedonian allies.  Athens could only work toward reaffirming 
the political strength of the polis within the confines of the League terms.  This strength 
was realised with a strong fleet, functioning economy and a trained military force.  
In the fifteen year period from the battle of Chaeronea to the death of Alexander, the 
Athenians drew on their past experience to establish themselves as a leading force in the 
New Greek world under the League of Corinth. Democratic Athens flourished under the 
domination of the monarchs, Philip II and Alexander III.  In adapting to Macedonian 
domination they established practices that were to advance the progress of the diadochoi 
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